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Introduction 
This paper will deal with relations between Italy and the European Communities in a 
historical perspective. It will take into consideration both exogenous and endogenous 
variables. As regards the exogenous, relations with the United States are of particular 
relevance. As for the endogenous, the focus will be on the way political parties have 
perceived the process of European integration. Here, one can distinguish three periods: from 
the·origins to the late 1970s; from the late 1970s to the mid 1990s and from the mid 1990s to 
today. The first period was characterized by the opposition of the left to European and 
Atlantic integration, on the basis of ideological contraposition; the second witnessed a shared 
consensus by all political parties on integration - especially European; in the latest period, 
domestic political divisions at times lead parties to oppose European integration. 
The end of WW/l 
At the end ofWWII the leaders of the main Italian parties- th~ Christian Democrat Alcide De 
Gasperi, the Communist Palmiro Togliatti and the Socialist Pietro Nenni - united to form a 
coalition government, lead by De Gasperi, which lasted from the end of 1945 to June 1947. 
The greatest institutional problem it had to confront, in 1 946, was the future of the monarchy. 
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On June 2, 1946, the monarchy was abolished by a popular referendum; the new Republican 
Constitution was then promulgated (January 1, 1948). 
However, Italian domestic developments were also to be influenced by events taking place on 
an international leveL Already prior to the formal end of hostilities, Churchill, Stalin and 
Roosevelt had met in order to try to outline possible post-war scenarios. The most celebrated 
meeting of the three leaders took place in Yalta, February 4-I I, I945. During that conference, 
an agreement was reached: the Declaration on a Freed Europe stated that every European 
state would have to hold free elections and proceed to establish democratic governments. In 
the years I946-48, the Central and Eastern European countries evolved into "popular 
democracies", i.e. communist-led satellite states, orbiting around the USSR. Unable to reach 
an agreement with the USSR on the future of Germany, the United States, France and Great 
Britain decided to create a German state in the three western zones of occupation. The 
Russian response was quick: on the night of June 23, I 948, all commercial traffic into Berlin 
was. blocked. Thus, for almost a year, the city was supplied by a gigantic air-lift, organized by 
American forces. In May I949, the blockade was finally lifted, and the division of Germany 
into the Western Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Germany was formalized. 
On September I 9, 1946, at the University of Zurich, Winston Churchill spoke of the need to 
unite Europe: "we must re-create the European family in a regional structure called, it may be, 
the United States of Europe. The first step is to form a Council of Europe" (Salmon and 
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Nicoll, 1997: 26-28)- yet Churchill only thought of a United States of Europe as limited to 
the continent. 
Churchill was not the only one calling for a united Europe. Of the different voices claiming 
that this would solve the continent's problems, the Italian one was particularly loud. From the 
little island ofVentotene, where he had been confined by the Fascist regime, Altiero Spinelli 
(1907-1986) wrote - along with Eugenio Colomi and Emesto Rossi - the Ventotene 
Manifesto. (1943). The authors affirmed that it was " [ ... ] the time for new men: for the 
MOVEMENT FOR A UNITED AND FREE EUROPE." (Spinelli, 1991: 37). In September 
1946, Spinelli, together with Alexander Marc, Henry Brugmans, and Henry Frenay founded 
the Union Europeenne des Federalistes in Paris: the subsequent Congress of Montreux 
(August 1947) was the first great manifestation for European integration in the post-war 
period, reuniting federalist and Europeanist movements from all over Europe ( Gerbet, 1983: 
57). Europe-wide organizations were created in those years by different political parties and 
movements: the Confederation Europeenne de I' Agriculture (1945), the Nouvelles Equipes 
Intemationales (NEI, 1947), the Mouvement pour les Etats-Unis socialistes d'Europe (1947), 
the Union Parlementaire Europeenne (1947), the Conseil des Federations Industrielles 
d'Europe (1949). 
All of these and other pro-European movements met at The Hague, March 7-10, 1948, at the 
Congress for the foundation of the European Movement. Under the presidency of Winston 
Churchill, approximately 800 pro-Europeanists participated: the delegations included both 
political and intellectual leaders such as Franyois Mitterrand, Salvador de Madriaga, Denis de 
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Rougemont, Paul Van Zeeland, Paul Ramadier, Paul Reynaud, Alcide De Gasperi, Olivetti\ 
Ignazio Silone, Bruno Visentini, Komad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Leon Blum, Anthony 
Eden, Fran<;ois-Poncet Sr., Waiter Hallestein, and Harold MacMillan (Gerbet, 1991, 371-
375). The Italian delegation, however, was formed more by intellectuals than by politicians. 
The process of European integration then developed in three successive waves: economic, 
with the Marshal! Plan and the creation of the European Organization of Economic 
Cooperation (OECE); diplomatic and military, with the Brussels Pact and the signing of the 
North Atlantic Treaty; political, with the Council of Europe and the European Communities. 
The Marshall Plan 
The reconstruction process was not an easy one for Europe. Substantial aid arrived from the 
Marshall Plan, announced by Gen. George Marshal! at Harvard on June 5, 1947. Sixteen 
countries participated in the economic conference, which was held from July 12 to September 
22, 1947, to determine Europe's needs: France, Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, 
Portugal, Greece and Turkey. Czechoslovakia, whose government had expressed an interest in 
participating in the conference, was forced by Stalin to retract its request. On April 16, 1948, 
at the Chateau de la Muette in Paris, a convention was signed which gave birth to the OECE, 
the organization which - in accordance with specific US requests - took charge of managing 
the Marshall Plan. The United States, in fact, was aiming to force the European countries to 
decide together about where and how to use the funds and support; in the end, indeed, the US 
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wanted Europeans to cooperate in creating an internal market - a condition particularly dear 
to the US Congress. 
The Italian government's reaction to the Marshall Plan was quick and positive. The plan was 
to be useful from a number of different points of view. First of all, it would improve the 
dramatic economic situation, thus positively influencing public opinion, also in view of 
approaching legislative elections. Also, the Marshal! Plan and OECE represented Italy's first 
chance to be reinstated in the international diplomatic game, on equal footing with other 
countries (Varsori, 1998: 52). Furthermore, Italy seized the occasion to propose that a 
customs union be established with France. The treaty was signed on March 26, 1949. In 
principle, the customs union was then to be enlarged to the Benelux countries (and to be 
called Fritalux, or Finebel), but, in the end, the union was never to see the light of day 
(Gerbet, 1983: 85-86). 
The North Atlantic Treaty 
On March 17, 1948, the UK, France and the Benelux countries signed the Treaty of Brussels, 
a defense treaty that was to last fifty years. Soon after that, the idea of a defense system 
between Europe and the United States started to be developed. With the utmost discretion, 
negotiations began among the .UK, the US and Canada at the Pentagon (the so-called 
Pentagon Talks). The group was subsequently enlarged to include France, Holland, Belgium 
and Luxembourg. Before the draft of the treaty was completed, other European countries 
became interested in what was to become the North Atlantic Alliance: Norway, Denmark, 
Iceland and Italy. The latter formally introduced its official candidature on January I, 1949. 
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France strongly opposed Norwegian membership, while it supported Italian participation -
seen as a guarantee for better strategic protection of Corsica and Algeria. Great Britain, on the 
other hand, opposed Italian participation due to the country's fragile economic and political 
situation. The British suggested that Italy should belong to a Mediterranean pact, separate 
from the North Atlantic system. 
For the United States, Italy represented a serious problem. First of all, from a geographic 
point of view, it was not an Atlantic country. Secondly, Italy was thought to contribute very 
little, in terms of military resources, to W estem European security. On the other hand, as far 
as politics were concerned, the US saw Italy's exclusion from the North Atlantic Alliance as 
potentially dangerous. Given its former enemy status, if Italy were not to maintain close ties 
to the other European countries it might assume an isolationist position. Moreover, given its 
solid communist background, Italy might easily be influenced by the Soviets. Therefore, in 
the end, despite several reluctant American Senators, a decision was passed to allow Italy to 
join as one of the founding members of the North Atlantic security system. As part of a 
comprehensive deal, Norway too became an integral part of the North Atlantic Alliance. 
The Council of Europe 
The creation of the Council of Europe in 1949, in accordance with the political initiative of 
French Foreign Minister Robert- Schuman, was the most important p9litical result of action 
undertaken by the European Movement. The German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer defined it 
"the most important event since the end of the war." This view was shared by the Italian 
Foreign Minister, Count Carlo Sforza. The United States, Belgium and Luxembourg all sided 
with the French initiative as well, while. the British seemed somewhat hostile towards the 
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proposal. A group of 18 representatives (5 English, 5 French, 3 Belgian, 3 Dutch, and 2 from 
Luxembourg), called the Comite d'etudes pour /'Union Europeenne, began its work on 
November 26, 1948 to study the various possible proposals. On March 28, 1949 the 
Committee was enlarged to include five more countries: Italy, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden. The name "European Union", proposed by Shuman, with the support of Italy and 
Belgium, was rejected by the British and by the Scandinavian countries because they feared it 
could mean "European Federation", a supranational political-institutional structure which 
Euro-skeptical countries would never have accepted. 
The Charter of the Council of Europe was signed in the palace of Saint J ames in London on 
May 5, 1949 by ten member countries. For Italy, it was a diplomatic success to be included in 
the negotiations (unlike what had happened with the North Atlantic Treaty, when it was 
barely accepted as a founding member). In domestic terms, Christian Democrat leader and 
Prime Minister De Gasperi also needed membership in the Council of Europe to gain support 
for membership in the Atlantic Pact. The decision to firmly link Italy to the Western world 
was in fact essentially the decision of a small group of leaders, led by the prime minister 
together with his Foreign Minister Sforza. 
Both the Communist and Socialist parties opposed membership in the_ North Atlantic Treaty. 
The Socialists asked for a popular referendum - which was denied - and its leader Pietro 
Nenni affirmed that, with the signature of the Treaty, "the Third War had been launched" 
(Scirocco, 2003:158). The Communist party was, at the time, totally subjugated to the USSR 
PCUS. But even the left fiinges of the Christian Democrats, led by Giuseppe Dossetti and 
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Giovanni Gronchi, were in favor of keeping an equidistant relation between the two 
superpowers: the US and the USSR. They thus favored a neutral, non-aligned Italy and 
opposed the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
As the Communists and the Socialists were definitely expected to vote against the treaty 
(Capperucci, 2003), De Gasperi desperately needed all of his party's votes in parliament. In 
this light, he used Italy's inclusion in the Council of Europe in order to "sell" Atlantic 
integration to his own party. In signing the North Atlantic Treaty (April 4, 1949), De Gasperi 
also underlined its political rather than military aspects. The founding treaty of the Council of 
Europe was signed soon afterwards (May 5, 1949). At the same time, the Italian government 
also negotiated a commercial agreement with Moscow. These ambiguities were to have an 
impact on Italy's foreign policy, however (Varsori, 1998: 74), as we shall see in the following 
paragraphs. 
From the Schuman Plan to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
Since the creation of the first government of the new Federal Republic of Germany, 
Chancellor Komad Adenauer never ceased to complain about limitations imposed by the 
Allies. He was committed to fully recuperating the sovereignty of Germany. In particular, he 
lamented the presence of the Allied Commission of Control, pointed to the International Ruhr 
Authority's strain on the German economy, and complained about France's control over the 
Saar region. At the end of WWII, Saar had in fact become an autonomous region, and had 
created an economic union with France. All the coal produced in the region was to be handed 
over to the French- a fact that raised the level of tension between the two countries. 
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The American High Commissioner in Germany, John McCloy, on behalf of the American ( 
govermnent, supported a French-German rapprochement within a European framework. 
Therefore, on the occasion of a meeting between Schuman, Bevin and Acheson, in 
Washington, in September 1949, the French foreign minister was asked to draft a project for a 
common policy towards Germany, in which the questions of Saar and Ruhr were to be 
addressed. Yet the winter passed without any improvements in French-German relations and 
without any proposals from Schuman. 
In April, Jean Monnet, then General Commissioner of the Plan de modernisation et 
d'equipement, took the initiative. He delivered a note to Bemard Clapier, Schuman's 
assistant, containing a proposal that he had prepared during the previous weeks with the help 
of a team of young lawyers: Paul Reuter, Pierre Uri and Etienne Hirsh. In the note, he 
affirmed that the only possible solution was to organize Europe on a federal basis. It was an 
old idea of his. Already on August 5, 1943, Jean Monnet (1976: 319-320)- then member of 
the provisional exiled French government -had written in his diary in Algeria: "there will be 
no peace if the (European J states are rebuilt on the basis of national sovranity [ .. .it is 
necessary that] the European states form a federation [ ... ]"(1976: 427). Monnet suggested that 
France should propose that the whole production of French and German coal and steel be 
placed under the rule of an independent international authority, open to the participation of 
other European countries. 
Schuman appreciated the idea and, after having obtained Adenauer's assent (thanks to the 
good office of a common fiiend, Judge Robert Mischlich) - officially presented to the press 
10 
(at 6 p.m. on May 9, 1950, at the Quai d'Orsay in the salon de l'Horloge) what was to be 
known as the Schuman Declaration. At the same time, in Bonn, Adenauer officially 
announced his country's acceptance of the proposal to journalists gathered for the occasion. In 
all, six governments welcomed the proposal and began negotiations: Italy, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg as well as France and Germany. 
For Italy, this was an important political and economic opportunity. It would help the 
country's difficult reconstruction of its democratic and economic systems. Furthermore, De 
Gasperi - aware that the Eastern markets were closed to Italy - chose to pit the Italian 
economy against the most competitive and difficult markets: the Atlantic and. Western 
European ones. According to Mario Telo (1996: 144-149), "De Gasperi was convinced that, 
in order to balance domestic instability, a strong counterweight of international dimensions 
was needed[ ... ); Sforza saw linking Italy to Europe as the country's only hope to emerge from 
defeat. Italy's future development depended on Europe and the West. For Italy to succeed in 
being more than a simple satellite of the United States [ ... it needed ... ) to intelligently 
combine the three dimensions of De Gasperi's action: bilateral relations- especially with the 
US; bilateral diplomacy within international organizations; and commitment to new 
supranational organizations, linked to European integration." 
Nevertheless, many people in Italy opposed this plan, both for political and economic reasons. 
According to Ambassador Achille Albonetti (1960: 133) difficulties derived from the fact that 
Italy "paid tribute to other countries for raw materials for the iron and steel industry and that 
domestic production in Italy cost more than elsewhere." The Italian ambassador in Paris, 
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Pietro Quaroni, opposed the proposal, convinced that the plan would favor French interests 
alone, thus threatening the Italian coal and steel industry. Nor did he trust Schuman's 
engagement in defending Italian industry. Quaroni also suspected that Monnet was a neutralist 
and that this might work against the Christian Democrats' pro-Atlantic positions. In the words 
of Paolo Emilio Taviani - then head of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 
delegation - "unlike La Malfa - who said Europe first, then the North Atlantic Treaty- we 
Christian Democrats said yes to Europe, but following the North Atlantic Treaty. We were 
convinced that we needed America on our side." (Roussel, 1996: 562). 
The Socialists continued to .oppose any kind of European integration - in total isolation from 
other European Socialist parties (Scirocco, 2003: 179). According to the Italian party's leader, 
Pietro Nenni, there was a need for a "national" foreign policy not guided by ideological 
constraints, but rather by the exclusive definition of the national interest (Scirocco, 2003: 
144). 
As for the Communists, the party's international political choices were subordinate to and 
coordinated by the USSR's foreign policy (Guiso, 2003: 207). The Communists' political 
discourse in this phase was centered on the need to preserve "Italian interests"- most notably 
geopolitical ones- against the transatlantic monopolies (Guiso, 2003: 219). 
Industry and, in particular, heavy industry- with the notable exception of FIAT- was against 
the ECSC for fear of the liberalization that would follow. The trade unions viewed things 
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differently: the Catholic trade union (CISL) was in favor of European integration and the 
leftist'one (CGIL) looked upon the European Communities with some interest. 
In the end, the decision to join the ECSC essentially belonged to the government, or, more 
precisely still; to De Gasperi and Sforza. The Treaty of Paris, which created the European 
Coal and Steel Community, was signed on April 18, 1951, with Italy as a founding member. 
The High Authority, presided by Jean Monnet, was established in Luxembourg on August 10, 
1951. 
The EDC and the end of Alcide De Gasperi 
Already during negotiations relating to the Schuman Plan, a new concern had emerged: 
German rearmament. The United States suggested the creation of an integrated, operative 
structure- NATO, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization- within the sphere of the Atlantic 
Alliance. Within this context, a German army could participate under direct American control. 
The French rejected this proposal, and were thus obliged, under increasing American 
pressure, to find an alternative for German rearmament. France's solution, born from the ideas 
of Monnet and the French Prime Minister Rem~ Pleven, was announced by Pleven at the 
French National Assembly on October 24, 1950. The Pleven Plan proposed the creation of a 
European army, to be placed under the control of a European Ministry of Defense. The 
soldiers coming from various countries - including Germany - would be integrated m a 
European army at a level of the smallest unit. 
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On February 15, 1951, Germany, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg met in Paris to start the 
talks. The Netherlands joined on October 8, while the United States, Great Britain, Canada, 
Norway and Denmark sent observers. As for the Italian position, in the summer of 1951, De 
Gasperi received a memorandum from Spinelli, who was convinced that the construction of a 
European army had to be accompanied by the creation of a supranational political organism. 
He saw this as the first step to realizing the United States of Europe. De Gasperi, who was 
·also in charge of foreign affairs at the time, fully shared these ideas, which became the 
guidelines for Italian action: Italy accepted the creation of a European Defense Community 
(EDC), provided that it would be instrumental in establishing a European political 
community. The result of De Gasperi's initiative was the addition, in the EDC treaty, of 
Article 38: this. stated that, once the EDC was established, its parliamentary assembly would 
be responsible for elaborating a project for the birth of a political community, to be examined 
by the member states. The new treaty, founding the European Defense Community, was 
signed on May 27, 1952, the day after the signing of the Bonn Agreements, which returned to 
Germany its sovereignty rights in the defense realm. 
According to Mario Telo (1996: 194-195), the only period in which Italy had a propulsive 
role at the European level was between the years 1951 and 1953. De Gasperi, who was deeply 
involved in the project, declared to the Christian Democrats in Naples in 1954: "Political 
collaboration among the countries of continental Europe represents the indispensable premise 
on which to build international relations of economic and social cooperation. Without these, 
Italy will never resolve its fundamental problems." In other words, De Gasperi's overarching 
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belief was that without European solidarity, Italy could not safeguard it own interests at an 
international level. 
Between 1953 and 1954, the EDC Treaty was ratified by Germany and by the Benelux 
countries. In Italy, the treaty was approved by the competent commission in Parliament, 
despite opposition from both right wing and left wing parties. However, the Italian Parliament 
did not vote for the treaty's ratification, prefening to wait for the French vote. The new Pella 
government- which took over after the 1953 elections- assumed a more nationalistic stance, 
trying to link the EDC question to that of Trieste, which had still not been given back to Italy. 
The follo"\\ling Mario Scelba government was not capable of changing this political stance. 
According to Sergio Pistone (1982: 153), the Italian Parliament's refusal to ratify the EDC 
Treaty had a negative impact on French public opinion. Meanwhile, as Robert Schuman was 
replaced by Georges Bidault at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pierre Mendes-France's 
new government, French public opinion was divided between the cedistes (favorable to 
ratification) and the anticedistes (opposed). Eventually, the treaty failed to be ratified at the 
National Assembly on August 30, 1954. 
The problem of German rearmament thus remained unresolved. A new initiative was 
launched- this time from the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden. ln 1954, it was decided 
that Germany would enter NATO, that Italy and Germany would join the Brussels Pact, and 
that the Western European Union would subsequently be created. It was also agreed that 
Germany would not develop atomic weapons and that two British divisions would be 
stationed in Germany. 
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In Italy, the end of the European Defense Community also symbolized the end of De 
Gasperi's political life. In supporting the EDC and the progressive creation of a federal 
project he was, once again, ahead of his own party. His fellow Christian Democrats were still ·· 
digesting the Atlantic choice at the time, and were not ready for the EDC Treaty. The old 
leader died just a few months after the failure of the EDC Treaty. 
The European Economic Community and the Euratom 
Jean Monnet was convinced that collaboration on atomic energy could revive European 
integration. The Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henry Spaak was also convinced of the need 
to revive the integration process: on April 2, 1955 he wrote to Konrad Adenauer and to his 
French and Italian colleagues, Antoine Pinay and Gaetano Martino, proposing to extend the 
competences of the ECSC to additional sectors, such as transportation and atomic energy. Jan 
Will em Be yen- the Dutch foreign minister- proposed, on April 21, 1955, at the Mouvement 
Europeen meeting, to create a supranational community, which would supersede an economic 
union. This was followed up with the so-called Benelux Memorandum. 
The reactions of France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy were very prudent. 
Monnet - who, meanwhile, had created a "Committee for the United States of Europe", 
gathering the leaders of European political parties and trade unions - invited the ECSC 
foreign ministers to convene an intergovernrnental conference with the aim of drafting, in 
collaboration with the BCSC institutions, the international acts necessary to further European 
integration. The Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Martino succeeded in gaining support for a 
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conference to be held in Messina. Italy's interests in a possible' nuclear community and in a 
prospective common market were strong enough for it to want to join the negotiations, but the 
country demanded that certain Italian needs be taken into consideration. Primarily, it felt that 
the principle of free circulation be applied not only to goods, but also to labor and capital. 
This first objective corresponded to the traditional Italian need to favor emigration for its 
laborers, while the second one revealed the government's special regard for Italy's South: it 
hoped that financial resources would flow throughout the peninsula, thereby contributing to 
the nation's overall development. 
At the Messina meeting (June 1-3, 1955), the foreign ministers of the six ECSC member 
states established that it was time to take new steps towards the creation of a European 
framework, and that these new steps needed to be taken predominantly in the economic 
sector. In particular, progress was called for in creating a common market and partial 
integration in the field of atomic energy. Naturally, divergences existed: the Germans, the 
Italians and the Dutch, for example, favored general economic integration, while France 
supported sector-by-sector integration. An intergovernmental committee, chaired by Spaak, 
was thus created (Spaak Committee). The committee's report (Spaak Report), was presented 
to the ECSC foreign ministers on April 21, 1956. Negotiations then began. The country 
showing the most resistance was- France. In particular, Mendes-France_ feared that the Italians 
would "export" their unemployment to France, something that Robert Maijolin (1986: 287) 
defined as a "vision apocalyptique". From Italy's perspective, given the country's poverty 
levels, the main preoccupation was indeed how to take advantage of this new initiative. The 
French thus posed a number of reservations, though they understood that, if they wanted 
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Euratom accepted at their conditions, they had to accept its linkage with the coinmon market, 1: 
a key criteria for other countries. In the end, _international events ended up providing the 
necessary impetus for the conclusion of negotiations: the invasion of Hungary (November 4, 
1956) and the nationalization of the Suez Canal (July 20, 1956). On March 25, 1957, the 
treaties creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom were signed in 
Rome (hence the name Treaties of Rome). 
In Italy, the invasion of Hungary also had a lasting effect on domestic politics. The Socialists 
(PSI) sharply criticized the USSR's intervention and broke their alliance with the Communists 
for good. Although they criticized the government for.the way it handled the negotiations and 
· thus abstained on the EEC, the Socialists voted in favor of Euratom (Scirocco, 2003). The 
change in the PSI's approach to foreign policy then allowed the party to join the majority 
supporting the government in 1958 and to formally enter the government in 1963. From then 
on, the Italian Socialists would remain pro~ European. 
From six to nine: the first enlargement 
The United Kingdom initially participated in the works of the Spaak Committee but then 
abandoned it, believing that the idea of a common market would fail. Instead, it promoted the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA, January 4, 1960). Yet, in the years 1958-62, the 
process for the creation of a customs union proceeded well, helping the growth of intra-
community exchange. The most controversial issue was the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), on which French and Italian interests clashed. On June 30, 1960, the Commissioner 
for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt (a former Dutch Minister of Agriculture) listed a number of 
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principles which were necessary for the CAP to function. Nevertheless, it took eight years to 
implement them, with interminable meetings known as the "agricultural marathons". 
In 'the meantime, in the spring of 1958, following the Algerian crisis, General Charles De 
Gaulle was called to lead the French government. He accepted on the condition that a new 
Constitution be prepared. The new Constitution, approved by referendum in September 1958, 
marked the beginning of the V Republic, of which De Gaulle was elected the first president in 
November. 
Contrary to initial pessimistic expectations, De Gaulle soon took the necessary steps towards 
implementing the common market. Still, he had a personal vision of Europe and of France's 
role in it. His "Europe Europeenne" or "Europe des Etats", made up of national states, was to 
hold a leadership position at least equal to the United States and the Soviet Union on the 
international scene. In this light, a plan was elaborated by the European Commission with a 
view to relaunching political cooperation among the EEC member states, called the Fouchet 
Plan. The first draft was presented on November 2, 1961 and a redraft in January 1962. The 
Italian government initially felt it was a modest proposal, yet nevertheless considered it a 
good first step. Despite the fact that Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani was far from 
enthusiastic about the Fouchet Plan, the Italian foreign ministry workeg hard to improve it and 
to foster consensus on a compromise text. In particular, Italy wanted any treaty to contain 
provisions for the direct election of the European Parliament and to give it control over 
defense expenses. Italy also wanted to have the new treaty ratified at the same time as British 
membership - which it supported - to avoid failing in the Parliament. In September 1962, 
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Italy further stated that it would not support any plan towards political union "until the British 
problem was resolved," a position also supported by the Foreign Minister Giuseppe Saragat 
during his visit to London in January 1964 (Ferraris, 1996: 155-157). In 1961, the British 
conservative government, lead by Harold Macmillan; had in fact introduced a request to join 
the EEC. 
Soon afterwards, in 1962, the Kennedy administration in the United States launched the 
"Grand Design"- the idea of cooperation between an enlarged European Community and the 
United States, including a multilateral nuclear agreement and common customs tariffs. 
However, the US also offered to let the British and the French install Polaris missiles on their 
territory. France rejected the offer and decided to become a nuclear power on its own. Charles 
De Gaulle then used the US proposal as an excuse to abruptly end membership negotiations 
with the United Kingdom, offering instead an association agreement. Macmillan, of course, 
took this as an offense, as it posed the UK at the same level as Greece and Turkey. Italy, 
disagreeing with De Gaulle, chose to keep supporting UK membership. 
Eventually, the crisis culminated over the Common Agricultural Policy. A Commission's 
proposal under examination called for the establishment, by July 1967, of a CAP common 
market; to be financed with tariffs and customs rights, which the community would administer 
as its own resources. On June 14, 1965 the Council began to discuss the issue. The French 
Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Mourville, who was chairing the meeting, opposed the 
Commission's proposals, and eventually dismissed the meeting on June 30. On July I, France 
announced its refusal to collaborate with Community institutions. Consequently, the French 
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representatives refrained from participating in the Council's working groups as well as in the 
COREPER meetings, giving birth to the so-called "empty chair crisis". 
Also on July 1, Italy assumed the EEC Presidency. Emilio Colombo (the treasury minister 
was also the acting foreign minister, due to Amintore Fanfani's health problems) tried to find 
an agreement with France. At the heart of the problem lay French opposition to the qualified 
majority voting system (QMV). This system was to become the decision-making rule in the 
Council starting January 1, 1966. Colombo invited France to attend an extraordinary meeting 
of the Council of Ministers and then, in a bilateral meeting held in France on December 8, 
1965 finally managed to convince Couve de Morville. to join a January 29 meeting of the six 
foreign ministers in Luxembourg (Ferraris: 1996: 163). There, in the absence of the 
Commission, an agreement was reached on the question of qualified majority voting. This so-
called Luxembourg compromise allowed member states to ask for unanimous decisions rather 
than QMV should a "vital interest" be at stake: in practical terms, this meant that, from that 
moment forward, consensus became the decision-making rule. 
1967 was a year of change in Europe. Kiesinger became the German chancellor, with Willy 
Brand! as foreign minister. The colonel's coup d'etat in Greece froze the association 
agreement between the EEC and Greece. The labor party won the elections in Great Britain 
and Harold Wilson became the new prime minister. Wilson soon re-introduced the UK 
candidature for EEC membership (May 2, 1967); however, despite the Commission's positive 
view, De Gaulle again vetoed Great Britain's entrance (November 27, 1967). 
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Only after De Gaulle resigned (April 27, 1969) and George Pompidou was elected (June 15 
1969) did things start to move again: Pompidou, in fact, proposed a Triptique to the sununit 
meeting in The Hague (December 1-2, 1969). The Triptique consisted of three principles: 
completion, deepening, enlargement. Completion of the conunon market by January 1, 1970, 
with particular attention to the CAP's financing with Community resources; the deepening of 
the Conununity, especially in the field of economic and monetary policy; and enlargement to 
Great Britain and other countries, under the condition that the Community would adopt a 
conunon position before the beginning of negotiations. 
Consequently, on April 22, 1970 the Treaty of Luxembourg was signed, according to which 
the Community was to acquire its own resources by 1975 and the Parliament's powers were to 
be slightly expanded. The Summit also commissioned a report to Pierre Wemer- prime 
minister of Luxembourg - on economic and monetary union. The report, published on 
October 17, 1970, proposed to create a European Monetary Union (EMU) within ten years 
and a common system for the national central banks. The plan was never canied out. The only 
concrete results were the "monetary snake" (April 24, 1972) and the subsequent European 
Monetary System (EMS, March 13, 1979). The Bali accords, which were at the foundation of 
the EMS, created a margin for the fluctuation of currency of +/-2.25%, but allowed a more 
flexible+/- ·6% for the weaker Italian and British currencies. 
From the Europe of nine to the Europe often (1973-1981) 
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The 1970s are considered a period of stagnation for the process of European integration. They 
were also difficult years for Italy. The country's domestic weaknesses heavily influenced the 
consideration of its European partners, which touched an all-time low. 
On July 2, 1970, the new European Commission entered into force with the Italian Franco 
Maria Malfatti as its president. In his speech to the European Parliament (September 16, 
1970), Malfatti expressed his hopes for the Commission to once again serve as the engine of 
European integration. However, less than two years later, Malfatti resigned to stand for 
political elections in Italy. Despite the fact that other commissioners had also resigned before 
time (Ralf Dahrendorf, for instance, had left to take up a university post), Malfatti' s departure 
was seen as an example of the Italians' lack of trustworthiness, undermining the role ofltalian 
commissioners to come (Perissich: 2008: 175). France eventually used this argument to strip 
Italy of the agriculture portfolio (Ferraris, 1996: 224). 
On October 27, 1970, the Davignon Report was approved, introducing proposals for 
cooperation in the field of foreign policy, or European Political Cooperation (EPC). Italy 
insisted on including security and defense in EPC, thus clashing with France (Ferraris 1996: 
220). The infective nature of European cooperation in the field of foreign policy was 
confirmed, however, by Henry Kissinger in his "New Atlantic Paper" (1973). The US 
Secretary of State affirmed here that the United States had global .responsibilities, while 
Europe's interests were only regional. In pronouncing 1973 as "the Year of Europe" (April 
23, 1973), Kissinger meant that the US should base its rapport with Europe on bilateral 
relations. This approach was not welcomed in Europe. Italy, in particular, claimed that Europe 
needed to speak with a single voice( ... by speaking with a single voice, Europe can dialogue 
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with US bilaterally, "infective nature of european cooperation"). However, when talks with 
the US took place, Italy was represented by two diplomats - Ambassadors Roberto Ducci and 
Roberto Gaja- rather than by a political representative, due to the collapse of the government. 
This considerably undermined Italy's role, as Ducci himself recalls in his memoirs (quoted in 
Ferraris, 1996: 223-224). 
In October 1973, the third Arab-Israeli conflict erupted. The first repercussion in Europe was 
an increase in oil prices: Italy was hardest hit as it was also suffering at the time from internal 
difficulties due to terrorism. For the first time, Italy blamed the European Community for its 
economic difficulties which, in turn, offered a sort of justification for the country's lack of 
respect for EEC deadlines and obligations. This was made possible by the Communist's 
changing attitude vis-a-vis the Communities: they no longer want~d to reject the EEC 
outright, but rather to refund (Ferraris, 1996: 224-225). 
The Italian domestic situation was further complicated by US President Richard Nix on's 
decision to recall the dollar's convertibility into gold. The EEC member states first tried to 
protect themselves through the "European Monetary Snake" created March 7, 1972, but this 
was not enough for Italy. Once the European Monetary System (EMS, I 978) came into vigor, 
Italy faced more difficulties and was forced to ask for partial derogations. Such weaknesses in 
its system were stigmatized by Italy's European counterparts - especially by Germany -
which called it the European Cinderella (or the "sick one"). Similarly, within the CAP 
debates, Italy was disadvantaged by the lack of a global agriculture strategy and by its 
patchwork domestic agriculture organization. Italy counted just one success in this period: it 
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succeeded in establishlng the European Regional Fund in 1973, thanks to British support, and 
despite the German refusal to fund it until Rome should prove capable of using the financing 
in an efficient way (Ferraris 1996: 120). 
Italy was thus in a weak position when it assumed the EEC presidency on July I, 1975. Its 
objectives were to speed up the process of European political union and to develop better 
relations with the Mediterranean area. In general terms, Italian action during its 1975 
presidency was weak and unimpressive. The only positive note was the decision - taken 
during the Rome European Council (December 1-2, 1975)- to have the European Parliament 
elected directly by the citizens (Ferraris, 1996: 231-232). Yet, when Emilio Colombo - in his 
capacity as European Parliament President- announced the date of the forthcoming elections 
to the plenary, on March 24, 1977, the only other Italian present in the room was Altiero 
Spinelli; the others were all in Rome for the elections of the new Italian President. .. (Ferraris, . 
1996: 233 and Spinelli, 1978: 831 ). Nonetheless, as we shall see in Chapter 4, the direct 
elections of the European Parliament were to have an important effect on Italy's domestic and 
European policies. 
Last but not least, again during the 1975 Italian Presidency, when the EEC was not invited to 
the summit of the most industrialized countries (Rambouillet, November 1975), the nine 
members tried to convince Italy to participate not in an individual capacity, but as EEC 
representative. Worried that this could constitute a dangerous precedent, Italy refused. 
From Euro-sclerosis to the return of European integration 
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The long "Euro-sclerotic" period ended by the mid 1980s. ln the first semester of 1980 Italy 
again held the Presidency. The agenda looked difficult: not only was it complicated by the 
question of the British rebate (Margaret Thatcher's famous "I want my money back"), but it 
also contained the negotiation of the 1980 Community budget and a partial revision of CAP. 
On the question of the British rebate, the Italian position- also supported by France- was to 
rebalance it though the creation of new policy areas. 1bis approach was rejected by Germany 
and Britain. 
Despite intense consultations organized by the Italian government in prepanng for its 
presidency, Italian action was less effective than hoped due to the domestic crises of the 
Cossiga I government (which eventually lead to the Cossiga II government). These difficulties 
led Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga to postpone the meeting of the European Council 
scheduled for April 27-28, 1980 (Ferraris, 1996: 323). After a first refusal on the part ofthe 
British prime minister to accept any compromise, an agreement was finally reached after a 
twenty-hour marathon meeting on May 30, 1980. This reduced the British contribution while 
giving the Commission a mandate to review the common policies in view of their more 
balanced future development (Ferraris, 1996: 324). 
Soon afterwards, the political geography of the European member states changed. In 1981, 
Frano;:ois Mitterrand was elected President of France on the basis of a communist-socialist 
majority, and on October 1, 1982, the Christian Democrat leader Helmut Kohl became 
Chancellor of Germany. Thanks to these two leaders, Franco-German relations remained at 
the heart of the European integration process. On the contrary, France's relations with Italy-
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whose government, for the first time, was headed by a leader from a party other than the 
Christian Democrats, Republican Giovanni Spadolini- were at a particularly low point at the 
time. Rome was accusing France of being too protectionist, while Paris was unhappy about 
Italy's strong links with the US (Ferraris 1996: 325). Relations improved later, however, in 
particular with the assumption of power by the Italian Socialist leader Bettino Craxi (1983). 
On the other hand, the arrival of the Christian Democrats in Germany immensely improved 
the country's relations with Italy. Italian and German Christian Democrat leaders would 
periodically meet to discuss European politics- usually at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's 
villa in Cadenabbia. In the mid 1980s and through the early 1990s, indeed, Italy ended up at 
the core of the European process,. playing an important role. 
When France first assumed the presidency of the Community (first half of 1984), Mitterrand 
was determined to make good use of it. First of all, negotiations for the EEC membership of 
Spain and Portugal were given new impetus. Still, it was thanks to the Italian presidency (first 
half of 1985) that the last remaining problems were solved and that the accession treaties were 
finally signed (June 12, 1985, taking effect on January 1, 1986). In particular, it took the 
negotiating skills of Giulio Andreotti - then Minister of Foreign Affairs - to disengage the 
deadlock on fisheries and fishing quotas which were preventing the signing of the accession 
treaty . 
.Secondly, France took a number of steps to facilitate what was to become the Single 
European Act of 1987. On February 14, 1984, the European Parliament approved Altiero 
Spinelli's Draft Treaty. In addressing the European Parliament, Frans:ois Mitterrand affirmed 
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that the Draft Treaty was a starting point towards further reforms, along with the Stuttagard 
Stuttgart Declaration, a document elaborated in 1981 by the German and Italian Foreign 
Miriisters Hans Gert Gensher and Emilio Colombo. At the European Council in 
Fontainebleau, two ad hoc committees were created: the "Doodge Committee" was in charge 
of studying the problem with institutional reforms, while the "Adonnino Committee" (chaired 
by an Italian Member of the Parliament) was in charge of outliriing prospects for the 
development of a European identity. The heads of state and government further agreed to 
name Jacques Delors the new president of the European Commission, as of January 1985. The 
Doodge Committee presented its report to the Council on March 19, 1985: it recommended a 
. number of measures to reinforce the European institutions and suggested that an 
Intergovernmental Conference (!GC) be summoned, as an instrument for its adoption. The 
Adonnino Committee presented its report on "a Europe of citizens" on June 20, 1985. 
The Italian Presidency of 1985 and the Single Market 
In the first semester of 1985, Italy again held the EEC Presidency. The Christian Democrat 
leader and Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti declared in his speech to the European 
Parliament (January 16, 1985) that the aim of the Italian Presidency was to convene an 
Intergovernmental Conference to reform the EEC Treaty. However, at the European Council 
in Milan (June 28-29, 1985), the United Kingdom and Greece presoented strong resistance. 
After a tense debate, the Italian Presidency took the unprecedented move to ask for a vote, in 
which Greece, Demnark and the UK were defeated and the !GC summoned. 
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The IGC began work on September 9, 1985. Although difficulties emerged~ especially as 
regards the harmonization of legislation - the pragmatic approach proposed by the 
Commission made it possible to reach a consensus. At the European Council in Luxembourg, 
December 2-3, 1985, the Single European Act was agreed upon. Due to domestic pressures, 
(coming essentially from the Federalists, led by Altiero Spinelli) Italy declared its discontent 
with the final result and stated that it would only ratify the treaty if the European Parliament 
did so, too. Italy therefore was present at the signing of the treaty (February 17, 1987), but did 
not sign itself until February 28, 1987, together with Denmark and Greece. 
In the same year, Italy gained an important victory over the so-called "Delors Package". The 
package introduced the idea of a fourth resource for the EEC budget - to be calculated in 
terms of GNP - which Italy strongly opposed, as it was bound to be penalized. In September 
1987, the prime minister - Christian Democrat Giovanni Goria - embarked on a tour des 
capitals to explain the Italian position, and in the European Council (Copenhagen, December 
4-5, 1987), he affirmed that Italy could not overlook its objections. Though the Italian 
government fell once again, Italy managed to hold firm on this issue and finally, thanks to 
Helmut Kohl, a compromise was reached according to which Italy's proposal to calculate the 
fourth resource on the difference between the GNP and VAT revenues was accepted (Ferraris, 
1996: 341-342). 
On the other hand, however, Italy's poor implementation record for directives needed to 
. complete the Single Market caused the country difficulties once again. In Italy, some blamed 
the problem on the EEC for failing to match Italian interests. In response, the new Ciriaco de 
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Mita government (April 1988), put a great emphasis on Europe and on the need to complete 
the Single Market. Nonetheless, Italy was forced to request (and succeeded in obtaining) a 
two-year delay in the liberalization of capital movements (Ferraris, 1996: 243-245). 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the new European Union 
1989 was a year of great change in Eastern Europe. Transformations in that year were to have 
lasting consequences for all of Europe and for the entire world. Their impact on Italian 
domestic politics are still being felt today. In. June 1989, Solidarnosc won the elections in 
Poland. In the meantime, the iron curtain between Austria and Hungary was removed: during 
the summer, Eastern Europeans started to flood. Western Europe through Austria. In 
Czechoslovakia the protesters, lead by V aclav Have! and Dubcek, obtained the resignation of 
the entire Communist party. In December, Have! was elected President of the Republic. In 
Bulgaria, Zivkov was forced to resign in November; the reformist Mladenov took his position 
and quickly announced free elections before May of the following year. In Romania, 
opposition forces took control of the entire country by December. Nicolae Ceausescu was 
captured in his attempt to escape and was immediately tried and shot. However, the event that 
. symbolizes the end of the Cold War remains the "fall of the Berlin Wall", which took place 
on November 9, when the doors from East Berlin to West Berlin were finally reopened. 
All of these changes inspired hope, but they also aroused fear over the prospect of a reunited 
Germany. As the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl himself suggested, the solution was to 
proceed further towards the process of European integration: a larger Germany in a stronger 
Europe. Once again, Italy was to play a leading role. On November 28, 1989, Kohl presented 
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a program of ten points to the Bundestag outlining steps to take in reuniting the country. 
European partners were forced to accept reunification (Di Nolfo, 2002: 1342). Consequently, 
the European Council in Strasbourg (December 8-9, 1989), while blessing German 
reunification, decided to summon two Intergovernmental Conferences - one on European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the other on political union. 
On July 1, I990- the day that marked the beginning of the monetary union between the two 
German republics- Italy again held the EEC presidency. A short time later, Giulio Andreotti 
was named prime minister. The Italian presidency gave top priority to the preparation of the 
IGC on EMU. Indeed, Andreotti proposed to hold an informal European Council meeting in 
Rome (October 27-28, I990) where, notwithstanding UK opposition, the Carli Report on 
EMU was approved. This eventually lead to Margaret Thatcher's defeat and resignation at 
home (November 28, I990). She was replaced by Jolm Major. Andreotti and his foreign 
minister, the socialist Gianni De Michelis, used their personal and political networks to secure 
a successful formal meeting of the European Council in Rome (December I 4- I 5, 1990). The 
two IGCs were successfully convened at the end of the Italian presidency, and negotiated into 
1992. 
While the I GC on EMU, for which most details had been set during the Italian presidency, 
went smoothly, the one on political union was more troubled. The so-called Luxembourg Non-
paper, presented by the Luxembourg presidency on April 17, 1992, was short-lived. Likewise, 
the Dutch Draft Treaty, presented by the subsequent presidency, at the beginning of October 
1992, was promptly and abruptly rejected. There was fear that no agreement would be 
reached at the European Council in December: "Never has a European Council had such a 
surcharged agenda," wrote The Economist (December 7-13, 1991, Vol.321, N.7736: 34.) in 
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reference to it. However, after a suspension and a great push by the French, German, Italian 
and Benelux leaders, an agreement was finally reached on the Treaty of Maastricht 
(December 9-10, I 991). 
Then, the ratification process was blocked by the Danish "no" (June 2, I 992), in a national 
referendum. Mitterrand subsequently announced that France too would hold a referendum, to 
show how the French supported the process of European integration. What he thought would 
be easy, however, turned into a nightmare. Meanwhile, the Italian lira and the British sterling 
were attacked by speculators. On September 4, Italy was forced to raise its interest rates, and 
had to devaluate the lira by 7%. On September 13, the Deutsche Bank intervened by lowering 
rates. On September 17 - three days before the French referendum - it became evident that it 
would be impossible to avoid a crisis of the European monetary system, which resulted in the 
withdrawal of the Italian lira and the British sterling. Despite everything, the "yes" prevailed 
in France (September 20)- though by a tiny margin (51.04% over 48.95%,.with 3.37% white 
ballots). Denmark too, after negotiating a number of opt-outs - notably on EMU - finally 
approved the treaty. 
On May 2, 1999, the European heads of state and of government judged eleven countries to· 
be qualified for Economic and Monetary Union: Portugal, Spain,. France, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Austria and Finland. How Italy managed to 
participate, having previously withdrawn the lira from the process, is a complex and 
interesting story. 
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From Maastricht to Amsterdam 
New enlargements then began to loom large on the horizon. On January 1, 1995, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden brought the European Union to 15, while Norway, once again, failed to 
join. In the meantime, the European Council of Copenhagen (June 21-22, 1993) had 
established a set of criteria for candidate countries to fulfill (the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria). With more enlargement in sight, it was decided to hold a new IGC: a Reflection 
Group was hence created, led by the Spanish Minister of European Affairs, Carlos 
Westendorp. 
In light of the upcoming IGC, the Italian government had approved a number of documents, 
outlining its own key priorities. Firstly, the IGC was to remedy the gaps and insufficiencies in 
the Maastricht Treaty, and, above all, prepare the ground for forthcoming enlargements of the 
Union. Secondly, there was the need for a treaty which the public could easily understand and 
which would strengthen the Union's democratic character, render its institutional mechanisms 
more efficient, and develop its capacity to play a leading, coherent and responsible role on the 
world ·stage. At the parliamentary debate that followed the presentation of the Italian 
priorities, five resolutions were approved supporting the government's position. However, 
discussion was only partially devoted to !GC issues: for instance, one resolution (the "Pezzoni 
Motion") concerned small industry's problems (!); another (the "Dotti Motion") asked for "a 
stable and authoritative government, provided with the constitutionally requested necessary 
consensus" (La Stampa and Il Sole 24 Ore, December 8, I 995). The latter request was 
eventually withdrawn. For the first time, too, debate was tense - a sign that domestic 
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conditions in Italy had changed. Indeed, the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall was to be felt 
profoundly and for a long time to come in Italy. 
Italy's old ruling parties were tom away. The transformation of the Communist party 
continues today. New political actors emerged, like Forza Italia and the Northern League. In 
March 1994, the right wing coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi (Polo) won the elections. For 
the first time, the Italian government was rather anti-European, and featured a Minister for 
Foreign Affairs- Antonio Martino- who was a proud member of Thatcher's Club de Bruges 
(I! Sole 24 Ore, May 24, 1994). In his first speech to Parliament, Berlusconi declared that 
Italy was to play "a leading role" in the framework of the European Union - mi sembra 
contradditorio (I! Sole 24 Ore, May 17, 1994). Minister for Agriculture Adriana Poli Bortone 
affirmed that Italy was "going to play hard in Brussels" (Il Sole 24 Ore, July 16, 1994). The 
Berlusconi I government opposed Slovenia's membership in the EU (!!Sole 24 Ore, July 17 
and August 31, 1994) and almost created a diplomatic case when the German CDU proposed 
a "two-speed Europe", in which Italy was to be in the circle of "late corners" (Il Sole 24 Ore, 
September 3, 1994). In truth, Italy's government was isolated in Europe: none of the member 
parties belonged to major European political families and a number of European counterparts 
objected to the presence of Alleanza Nazionale (former MSI- inheritor of the fascist party) in 
the government. 
At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, Italy lost its international geopolitical 
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significance. It took a long time for Italy to realize this and to redefine its foreign policy. 
Indeed, the process continues. Former ambassador and historian Sergio Romano wrote in 
1993: "Unhappily, the regime is dying, while the position Italy has occupied for the last 45 
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years is disappearing entirely. That position was an element in a delicate mechanism whose 
counterweights were European integration, the United States, the Atlantic Alliance and [ ... ] 
the Soviet Union. [ ... ] Italy no longer knows what it can reasonably expect and lacks the 
means to obtain its goals. Italy no longer has a foreign policy because its objectives and its 
instruments have disappeared, all at once." (Romano, 1993: 109). 
At the European Council in Madrid, it was decided to open the IGC in Turin on March 29, 
1996, during the Italian presidency. This time, however, embedded in its domestic problems, 
Italy's contribution was weaker than in the past two presidencies. The Berlusconi I 
government had collapsed, to be replaced by the Lamberto Dini government. Legislative 
elections followed (April!996), which led to the formation of the Prodi government. These 
changes did not really modify the Italian position in the IGC. However, Prodi's government 
expressed- in a Joint Declaration, together with France and Belgium, and annexed to the new 
treaty- its discontent for the results achieved. In the declaration, the three states affirmed their 
determination to make greater progress concerning the composition of the Commission, the 
weighting of votes in the Council and the extended use of the QMV. The Italian parliament's 
views were similar, as it proceeded to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty with 428 votes in favor, 1 
against and 44 abstentions (the Northern League) in the Chamber of Deputies and with the 
positive votes of all parties but ·the Northern League in the Senate as well (Il Sole 24 Ore, 
June 4, 1998). The new treaty came into effect on May I, 1999. 
Towards the fifth enlargement: the Treaty of Nice 
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Many member states shared the concern expressed by Italy, France and Belgium that the 
challenges of enlargement could not be met by the Treaty of Amsterdam alone. In its meeting 
in Koln (June 3-4, 1999), the European Council thus decided to summon a new IGC for the 
beginning of 2000, with the aim of resolving the so-called "Amsterdam leftovers": the 
organization of the Commission, the reweighting of the votes in the Council, the extension of 
the qualified majority voting system. The IGC started its work in Brussels on February 12, 
2000, under the Portuguese presidency, and progressed quickly. Unfortunately, during the 
second semester (under the French presidency), difficulties abounded. 
All the major actors that had made the treaty possible had left government by this time. 
Jacques Chirac had replaced Fran<;:ois Mitterrand, but did not equal him in negotiating 
abilities. Gerhard Schriider, with a Socialist-Green coalition, had taken over in Germany, 
further weakening the French-German couple. Italy was far less pivotal than in the past, 
despite the fact that former Prime Minister Romano Prodi had been elected head of the 
European Commission after Jacques Santer's resignation in 1998. 
The two European Councils organized by the French presidency in Biarritz (October 13-14, 
2001) and in Nice (December 7-9, 2001) were among the least impressively managed 
gatherings in the history of European integration. Italy, Germany, France, the UK and Spain 
were in favor of "capping" the Commission at 15 or 20 members. Italy, together with France, 
the UK, Sweden, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, was also in favor of a simple 
reweighting of the votes in the Council. The rest of the member states supported the idea of a 
double majority. Last but not least, Italy, alongside Germany, France, Belgium, the 
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.. Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal, was in favor of extending qualified majority as a 
general rule. Italy also supported the idea of strengthened cooperation, together with 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, Austria and 
Finland. 
In spite of these differences and despite many difficulties - and after almost five days of 
negotiations all told - the Union finally reached an agreement: the Treaty of Nice. On this 
occasion, the European Council also adopted an Italian-German proposal aimed at opening a 
detailed debate on the future of Europe, which would involve the Union's institutions, the 
national Parliaments and civil society. 
Towards the new European Constitution 
Although the Union had succeeded in reaching an agreement, and signed the Treaty of Nice, 
member states recognized that the treaty would still not suffice in the face of inevitable 
problems presented by a much enlarged EU. Alternative means for revising treaties were 
needed. It was thus decided to summon a Convention, as had been done for the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Once again, Italy's role was to be pivotal, yet not as positive as in the 
past. 
Silvio Berlusconi had regained power in Italy in 2001. He decided to name his Deputy, 
Gianfranco Fini, as his personal representative to the Convention. As Fini was the leader of 
the post-fascist party "National Alliance", the Belgian government balked. The Belgians tried 
to claim that Berlusconi did not need to name a personal representative, and suggested that the 
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Vice President of the Convention, Giuliano Amato, serve as the representative of the Italian · (. 
government. Both the prime minister and Senator Amato refused such a reading. Political and 
diplomatic tension grew, until the question was finally settled with Mr. Fini's confirmation 
and an official explanation that the Conclusions of the European Council would read 
differently in the Dutch and Italian versions(!). In the end, the Convention experience proved 
fundamental in finalizing the conversion -both of Fini personaily and of his party - to pro-
European values. The EU member states came to accept him and his party as a respected 
player foilowing this experience, thus proving Berlusconi's nomination a great success. 
The Italian members of the Convention were remarkably active during the Convention, in 
contrast to Italy's tradition of absenteeism in the European Parliament. The most influential 
Italian member was without a doubt Amato, who had previously also worked on a 
consolidated version of the EU at the European University Institute. Prof. Amato's role was 
pivotal, thanks to his ability to reconcile different positions and to his deep knowledge of EU 
law. He was particularly successful in softening the rather "presidential"/fonnal style of the 
Convention's president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing. 
Despite ail these positive factors, Italian domestic politics nevertheless wielded significant 
influence. Thanks to ail these positive factors, Italian domestic politics wielded significant 
influence) over the beginning of the Convention's work. When the Berlusconi II government 
was first formed, Ambassador Renato Ruggero was appointed Foreign Minister. A former top 
diplomat and secretary general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and a very close 
friend of Fiat's President Umberto Agnelli, his nomination was welcomed in Italy and abroad 
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as a stgn of continuity in Italian foreign policy. Domestically, he was perceived as a 
counterbalance to the presence of anti-European forces in the government. 
Unfortunately, however, clashes between the foreign minister and the rest of the government 
emerged quickly, eventually leading ambassador Ruggero to resign. Upon Ruggero's 
resignation, Berlusconi temporarily assumed the post of foreign minister himself. He kept the 
position from January to November 2002. Therefore, as the Convention was launched, 
Berlusconi was both prime minister and foreign minister. However, by the end of the first 
year of Convention negotiations, with the Italian presidency approaching and the situation 
becoming unmanageable, Berlusconi finaiiy named a, new foreign minister- the then Minister 
of Public Works- Franco Frattini. When first named, Frattini was generaily perceived to be a 
Berlusconi yes-man, who would let him continue to run Italian foreign policy from the 
Presidency of the Council. This, however, proved untrue: a former top student with an 
impressive (legal) curriculum in the Italian Public Administration, Frattini soon acquired in-
depth knowledge of the EU technical dossiers, quickly gained the diplomatic skills needed at 
the Famesina, and developed into an excellent and dedicated foreign minister. 
Nonetheless, the Italian EU presidency of2003 started with a major incident. On July 2, 2003, 
Silvio Berlusconi was attending the Plenary of the European Parliament to illustrate, as 
custom, the forthcoming Italian presidency. In the course of the discussion, the German MEP 
Martin Schulz aggressively attacked Italy for its immigration policies and for Berlusconi's 
failure to end. the conflicts of interest between his own business and political activities. 
Berlusconi in turn overreacted, essentially accusing Schulz of being like a Nazi, creating a 
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serious diplomatic row with Germany, which· gravely endangered the beginning of the Italian 
presidency (European Voice, July 3, 2003). 
On July 18, 2003 in Rome, the President of the European Convention, Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, presented the "Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe" to the Italian 
EU presidency, In order to complete the EU reform process, it was now necessary to formally 
open a conference of government representatives from the member states - another 
Intergovernmental Conference. Opinion diverged about how to proceed, however. Some 
members wanted to go back to their national parliaments before launching the final 
negotiations, but others wanted to take advantage of the positive impetus provided by the 
Convention. In the end, the European Council asked the Italian presidency to launch the IGC. 
This suited Berlusconi, as he also wanted the new treaty to be signed in Rome, before the end 
of the Italian semester. For this reason he put pressure on the IGC negotiations. 
Negotiations were not easy. The Italian presidency sought to underscore the continuity 
between the Convention and the IGC, however, over the summer, the member states had 
examined the Convention's proposals and it had become clear that several problematic points 
persisted: these would have to be discussed again, by the IGC. The IGC was followed 
meticulously by the Famesina. the same can be said of the concluding European Council as 
well (Brussels, December 12-13, 2003). 
With such careful planning, the first part of the European Council concluded quickly and 
satisfactorily. It was then time to move on to the I GC. Italy recognized that the main obstacle 
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remaining was the question of QMV - due, in particular, to the opposition of both Spain and 
Poland (though Poland was not yet even an EU member state). Its strategy, therefore, was to 
reach a compromise on this point above all, hoping that the resolution of all other outstanding 
problems would follow smoothly. Unfortunately, however, all efforts were useless. Faced 
with a deadlock situation, the Italian presidency was unable to make a balanced proposal, one 
that would be acceptable to everyone. Italy was left with the arduous task of admitting that it 
was impossible to reach an overall agreement. The Intergovernmental Conference accordingly 
issued a statement, declaring that negotiations had failed and asking the Irish presidency to 
continue consultations. 
The 2003 Italian presidency Jacked the support of both France and Germany, whose backing 
had been fundamental in the previous Italian presidencies (1984 and 1990). This, ultimately, 
led to the failure of the I GC. 
Before finishing its term, the Berlusconi government was then trapped in another problem of 
both domestic and European dimensions. In June 2004, a new European Parliament was 
elected and a new President of the Commission was chosen: the conservative Portuguese 
former Prime Minister Manuel Durao Barroso. When the Berlusconi Il government was 
initially formed (2001), one of the party leaders joining the governmeni coalition- the former 
Christian Democrat Rocco Buttiglione - had accepted a post perhaps below his standing and 
expertise: that of Minister for EU Policies. Fluent in several languages, Buttiglione in fact had 
one political ambition - that of becoming European Commissioner. In his mind, the post of 
EU Minister was a stepping stone towards that goal in 2004. Indeed, Buttiglione got the 
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Italian government's designation. However, the Italians had not taken carefully enough into ( . ) 
consideration the fact that the European Parliament had acquired significant power in 
confirming the govennnents' choices, and that it would wield that power as a political 
instrument. 
With the Socialist leader Josep Borell Fontelles leading the protest, the Parliament expressed 
its disapproval of Barroso's choice to give Buttiglione "Home and Justice Affairs" - a 
portfolio also including civil liberties. Until then, the Portuguese socialist and brilliant lawyer 
Antonio Vitorino had been in charge of this portfolio. Buttiglione, on the other hand, was 
known for his intransigent Catholic stance and for his proximity to the then Pope John Paul II. 
Questioned about gay rights during the formal hearing by the Civil Liberties Committee in the 
European Parliament, he eventually mentioned his personal moral sanction of homosexuality. 
In an absolute first, and with a vote of 26 to 27, the parliamentary committee rejected his 
nomination to the Commission (October 11, 2004). Borrell hence informed Barroso that the 
Parliament would veto his Commission should Buttiglione not be removed. Barroso, in turn, 
told Berlusconi that it was an Italian domestic problem, one that he could not resolve. Once 
again, Franco Frattini was chosen by Berlusconi to save the day. And, again, Frattini turned 
out to be an excellent Commissioner, though his legacy was marred somewhat by his 
departure one year before the end of the term to run for the national Parliament. Soon 
thereafter he was named foreign minister for a second turn. 
The subsequent Prodi II govennnent (2006-2008) - whose first move on the international 
stage was to withdraw Italian troops from Iraq (La Repubblica, June 3, 2006) - sought to 
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relocate European integration at the center of Italian foreign policy. In so doing, he followed 
the tradition and the strategic approach of the Christian Democrat governments of the past: he 
equated the European and the national interests. In an early speech in front' of the Italian 
Parliament (May 18, 2006), Prodi affirmed: "We will be guided by precise choices in our 
foreign policy: we choose Europe and the integration process as the best environment for 
developing Italian policy [ ... ] Europe represents the map on which Italy- a country destroyed 
by war- bet its future. As long as Italy honors this bet, it wins. Naturally, Europe too has its 
crises, which we do not ignore or underestimate. Indeed, Europe needs us. Europe needs an 
Italy that dares take up the mantle of its long tradition, that dares to relaunch an integration 
process - through new initiatives and concrete actions - that offers tangible answers to the 
demands of millions of Europeans.[ ... ] We are convinced that the Italian national interest 
and the European interest are one and the same. We are convinced that Italy will count-
even in relations with its greatest ally- only if it counts in Europe. We will work to put Italy 
back among the leaders of a new Europe." (www.camera.it) 
The case of the redistribution of seats in the post-2009 European Parliament confirms this 
ambiguity. Should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, the number of Italian MEPs will be cut. 
The recounting that leads to this conclusion, done in the European Parliament, was based on 
the number of residents in a given country, rather than the number or voters: this means that 
Italy will have six fewer MEPs than with the previous system. Italy will end up with fewer 
MEPs than France. Incidentally, the rapporteur in the European Parliament was the French 
MEP Alain Lamassoure, and thus the report took his name. The Lamassoure Report was 
approved by the European Council meeting held in Brussels on June 21-23, 2007, but when 
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word reached the Italian press, people protested vehemently. Calls were made for Italy to use 
their veto. There was general outrage again when the European Parliament approved the new 
provisions in the Lamassoure Report (October 11, 2007). Curiously, however, the Italian 
representatives in Brussels did not seem to take the issue so seriously: on the day of the vote, 
the only Italian representative present was MEP Riccardo Ventre! 
Eventually, a solution was found to assuage the diplomatic egos: one more MEP would be 
added to the final number (the formula being 750 plus the president), and that extra MEP 
would go to Italy. However, the real question remains: hadn't the two Italian representatives-
Romano Prodi and his Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema- realized what was going on? 
Had they left the meeting rooms, as rumors suggest, to resolve a domestic political problem? 
Or were they aware of what was happening, but hoped that it would go unnoticed back home? 
Whichever of these versions is correct, it certainly does not speak highly for Italian diplomacy 
in action. 
Still, the Prodi 11 government did produce the first comprehensive reflection on the future of 
Italian foreign policy: the "ltalia 2020" paper. This text was the comprehensive result of work 
by a number of Italian stakeholders. In it, Europe again plays a central role: the paper 
questions how best to preserve national interests in an enlarged European Union. The EU 
policy areas that are identified as most strategic for Italy are EMU, defense, immigration and 
home security. It clearly calls for more coherent action. As the paper claims: "The effort to 
build a more coherent image- a concrete and continuative one- for Italy in Europe demands 
first greater solidity on the domestic level. From many points of view, in fact, European 
policy is no longer "foreign" or "international", but rather "intermestic". If the old theory of 
"external constraint" (vincolo esterno) was based on the assumption- which long held true-
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that Italy would derive inner strength from its association with Europe, today that constraint 
appears inverted: only through greater domestic stability will Italy carry any weight in 
Europe. Only thus wiii Italy have the capacity to influence decision-making on policy which, 
as it is European, is also necessarily domestic." (MAE 2008: 15) 
Two years later, Silvio Berlusconi was back as prime minister, this time with a more 
comfortable majority than in the past. Today, he is determined to undertake the changes he 
had been unable to enact during his previous stints in government. To do so, he needs to focus 
primarily on domestic policy, and is thus delegating Italy's foreign policy to Franco Frattini, 
the now experienced foreign minister. 
In his speech to the Italian Parliament, to present his program, Berlusconi only briefly 
mentioned the future of Italian foreign policy and Europe in particular: "Italy's role in Europe 
and in the world [ ... ] will serve as a compass for our work, as founders of the European 
project and as a great Mediterranean nation. We will be called upon to enhance relations 
between the two shores of our sea and to act as a pillar in the friendly relations between 
Europe and the United States of America." 
In presenting the specificities of his foreign policy to the Italian Parliament (July 2, 2008) 
Frattini confirmed the impressions of those who had noticed how strongly his time spent as 
European Commissioner had impacted the minister's actions and values. Despite touching 
upon Italy's role in the rest of the world - namely as regards transatlantic relations and 
relations with the Middle East, Russia, and various international multilateral fora - most of 
Frattini's speech was devoted to the future of European integration and the role Italy was to 
play in it. Frattini defined European int~gration as the first axis around which Italian foreign 
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policy would revolve,. the other being transatlantic relations. He made a point of explaining ( · . ) 
that these two were not in contradiction with each other. Frattini also used a bipartisan 
approach to foreign policy, and this has so far met with the approval and support of the 
opposition. 
The new course in Berlusconi's government and in Italy's European policy was confirmed, on 
July 31, 2008 by a unanimous vote, when the Italian Parliament ratified the Treaty of Lisbon 
(www.camera.it). 
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